Panopticon's Author Index Dd

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Dd Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari
Jacques Derrida
Rene Descartes

 


GILLES DELEUZE AND FELIX GUATTARI

Known as "D & G" to cultural theory junkies everywhere.

Postmodernism's most famous double act (though to be fair, they don't do everything together), Deleuze and Guattari emerged from the same late 1960s intellectual hothouse as Jacques Lacan and Michel Foucault. For a kick-off, they took Freudian theory to new extremes (like Lacan) by proposing that the self is fragmented and decentered, consisting of a "multiplicity of "desiring machines" (Turkle, 1995).

"Deleuze and Guattari argue that capitalism is a schizophrenic system, i.e. it makes everyone in it schizophrenic. Because it is interested only in the individual and his profit it must subvert or deterritorialize all territorial groupings such as the church, the family, the group, indeed any social arrangement. But at the same time, since capitalism requires social groupings in order to function, it must allow for reterritorializations, new social groupings, new forms of the state, the family, or the group - in other words new identities. [See also Turkle for more about this.] These events happen at the same time. The life of any culture is always both collapsing and being restructured. The point of the distinction is to allow for a post-Marxist analysis which can be social and materialist without accepting the historical inevitability of the [Hegelian] dialectic."

NB: One of their most famous works is called Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. In this work the two authors tried to develop a "political analysis of desire" (see below). The idea is that, by "reconciling the Marxist opposition between consciousness and ideology with the Freudian opposition between consciousness and desire," they "sought to introduce unconscious desire as a productive feature of political economy" (The Continental Philosophy Reader, p. 403).

NB: D & G are not Marxists. They argue there is no such thing as a class struggle because there is only one class, the class of slaves, some of whom dominate others. (This is not too dissimilar to Foucault's idea that we all have a little power and we all use it in varying levels to control each other.) Most so-called "desiring individuals" can never fulfil their desires. Why? Because each individual moves between two poles, between a.) schizoid desire, which is revolutionary but anti-social, and b.) paranoid desire, which is social but codified and demands its own repression. The two cancel each other out.

They aren't Freudian, either (although both were influenced by Freud, and Guattari in particular got a lot of his ideas from Lacanian psychoanalysis) because they talk about an "Oedipal prohibition." This produces the neurotic person who has internalized guilt in order to repress desire; however, this is not a fact of nature (as Freud would argue) but the result of social codification.

(See also Deleuze and Guattari: An introduction. Available from http://130.179.92.25/Arnason_DE/Deleuze.html)
10/97

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JACQUES DERRIDA

~~k.i.s.s.~~
Prominent French poststructuralist. He studied the nature of language, knowledge and meaning, and was a pioneer in deconstructing, (i.e., decentering, or breaking down to an individual level) many of modernism's so-called "deep structures," such as with language. He also criticized the hierarchical nature of traditional, Western-oriented binary oppositions.

I.
"Il n'y a pas de hors-texte"
(There is Nothing Outside the Text)

Derrida deconstructed language and Western philosophy, emphasizing the notion of decentering. Looking at texts in a poststructuralist way (things that communicate information to us are texts to postmodernists, but works to modernists, by the way), he made the (notorious) claim that "there is nothing outside the text", i.e., there are no signifiers in text that can relate to any sort of "reality." When language (whether spoken or in texts) tries to deal with society or some other externality, signifiers slide into other signifiers without reaching a signified; they only reach meaning when working on some immediate, limited level. But there is no ultimate truth which can be arrived at through language. Making any sense?

Okay: so why is language so important? Well, Derrida, like Lacan and Barthes, thinks that our whole identities are constructed out of language, nothing else. If that sounds daft, at least ponder on this for a moment. In structuralism language still has some relationship to reality. For example, if I point to an airplane and say "airplane," I am using the structure of language to relate my concept of that physical object of an airplane (albeit in terms of other words in the system, but let's not get into that just now). But how would I describe an airplane to someone from, say, Mars who has no idea what an airplane is? Unless he was right there so I could point the airplane out to him, I would have to describe it to him. And to do that, I would have to use other words to give the description "meaning" (presuming he could speak English, of course). If I looked up airplane in the dictionary, I would find other words to describe airplane (aircraft, jetliner, etc.) but that gets me no closer to what an airplane actually is. After all, a dictionary is just a bunch of synonyms, or signifiers in semiotic terms.

Now Derrida would argue that, in fact, we cannot get past this problem of words just leading to other words when we are trying to relate the "outside world" to each other, and that this is a big problem for us. Why? Because we become stuck in an endless chain of signifiers (i.e., all those words), and are unable to get to what is really out there. We like to think we're dealing with the real world, but in fact we're just dealing with a construction of the world we've built up using language. And because we're stuck in that construction, our selves are therefore constructed by langauge. This is Derrida's "chain of signifiers" (like Lacan's idea of "glissement"): when we try to mean something or discover who we are, our descriptions only slide off from one signifier to another. This means that the self is effectively fragmented, and we lose our Cartesian sense of identity; we are all subjects to the social formations of language. This fragmentation leads to a sort of schizophrenia, because of our lack of identity. Pretty depressing, I think.

II.
A quick review of Derrida: His deconstruction approach emphasizes the following:
1) The concept of "sous rature" meaning "under erasure" (influenced by German Heidegger -- more on this to come). Derrida developed this into an attack on language.
2) Saussure's theory of a signifier/signified/sign relationship is inadequate, he argued,.
3) Language is "semiotic play" where you never reach a true meaning, only a new set of signifiers, or a chain of signifiers (i.e., like a dictionary).
4) The sign only reminds you of the absence of a thing, not its presence - all you have is the sign.
5) He broke with structuralist theory; language is not stable, only a chain of intertextuality.
6) Deconstruction (Derrida's term) is the ideological opposite of structuralism - language is seen as 'chains of signifiers' with only unsatisfactory glimpses of meaning.

7) Derrida distinguished between phonocentrism, the traditional western, Platonic obsession with the voice; and logocentrism, the obsession with the word, i.e., the 'big explanation' of everything. Western philosophy is phonocentric, because it favors the spoken voice (think of the importance of rhetoric and debate in Western culture): the voice proves what it is saying by virtue of the fact that it is spoken, immediate (the "inner voice"). This: "It is for this reason that the Western philosophical tradition, from Plato to Levi-Strauss, has consistently vilified writing as a mere lifeless, alienated form of expression, and consistently celebrated the living voice" (Eagleton, 1996, p. 113). Anyway, Derrida had problems with both: logocentrism, because of its search for a big system which explains everything; and phonocentrism, because of its suspicion of texts in favour of the spoken word. Nevertheless, he eventually rejected phonocentrism and concentrated on the power of writing. (See Derrida's main works, e.g., Of Grammatology).

Criticism of deconstruction: 1) If there is no such thing as truth or meaning or self how did culture get this far and how can critics like Derrida write about it? 2) Chains of sliding signifiers - signifiers rub against each other until you get some spark of meaning? Maybe, maybe not. If not, how do we really understand each other, since we have no common elements of meaning outside of our own schizophrenia?

III.
Derrida on language.
The Structuralist approach to language ultimately presents and accepts the impossibility of using language to study language, of examining culture while one is a part of that culture. Its adherents include, among others, post-structuralists such as Derrida.

IV.
Spinal Tap -- once described as a "Derrida-esque" film; there is nothing outside the text.

V.
Derrida's work Dissemination, along with Barthes' S/Z, has proved particularly useful in categorizing and defining the potentials of the hypertext medium. The chains of signifiers idea does have some resonance with the we we use hyperlinks and the World Wide Web (see the Barthes entry for more on this).
2/98

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RENE DESCARTES

Descartes, with his famous maxim cogito ergo sum, or "I think, therefore I am," essentially posited a dualist, non-skeptical concept of reality, saying that reality is quite simply that which we experience with our minds -- period. This is the famous 'mind-body split' -- the idea that humans could be independent observers of the non-deterministic world around them (something that would be attacked consistently by philosophers of various stripes in the 20th century). Ultimately, however, Descartes' theory rested on the existence of a beneficient God. Basically, to buy into Descartes you had to accept that (a.) there was a God and (b.) that S/He would be a "nice guy," who would let us hold on to our "real" reality, and who wouldn't deceive us so systematically that everything we sensed was a mirage. Not surprisingly, some people thought that this was a bit of a stretch.

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